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Abstract The New General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) requires organizations to conduct a data
protection impact assessment (DPIA) when the pro-
cessing of personal information may result in high risk
to individual rights and freedoms. DPIA allows organi-
zations to identify, assess and prioritize the risks related
to the processing of personal information and select
suitable mitigations to reduce the severity of the risks.
The existing DPIA methodologies measure the severity
of privacy risks according to analysts’ opinions about
the likelihood and the impact factors of the threats.
The assessment is therefore subjective to the expertise
of the analysts. To reduce subjectivity we propose a set
of well-defined criteria that analysts can use to measure
the likelihood and the impact of a privacy risk. Then,
we adopt the fuzzy multi-criteria decision-making ap-
proach to systematically measure the severity of privacy
risks while modeling the imprecision and vagueness in-
herent in linguistic assessment. Our approach is illus-
trated for a realistic scenario with respect to LINDDUN
threat categories.
Keywords Privacy risks · Privacy Risk Assessment ·
Fuzzy Set Theory
1 Introduction
The advent of new technologies like cloud computing,
the Internet of Things and Big Data Analytic have en-
abled public and private organizations to collect, store
and analyze huge volume of consumers’ personal infor-
mation. In particular, Big Data Analytic represents a
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competitive advantage for organizations because it re-
veals who their customers are, how they spend their
time, and what kind of products and offers engage them.
However, consumers are really concerned about the pri-
vacy risks resulting from the collection and processing
of their personal information.
To minimize consumers’ privacy risk, the new Eu-
ropean General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
has introduced stringent obligations for organizations
on the collection, processing, storage and dissemina-
tion of consumers’ personal information. In particular,
organizations must always conduct a data protection
impact assessment (DPIA) when the processing of con-
sumers’ personal information could result in a high risk
to the consumers’ rights and freedoms. The GDPR does
not specify which methodology to follow to conduct a
DPIA but sets out the minimum requirements a DPIA
methodology should satisfy [19]:
– a description of the envisaged processing operations
and the purposes of the processing;
– an assessment of the necessity and proportionality
of the processing;
– an assessment of the risks to the rights and free-
doms of data subjects in terms of their likelihood
and impact;
– the measures envisaged to address the risks and
demonstrate compliance with this Regulation.
However, existing methodologies to conduct a DPIA
[5,9,1,13] do not provide a systematic approach to as-
sess the severity of a privacy risk based on likelihood
and impact and they often adopt similar processes to
the one used to rate security risks. However, the same
process cannot be applied to rate security risks and pri-
vacy risks. First, security risk assessment techniques,
rely on security analysts to rate impact and likelihood
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of threats with respect to simple linguistic scales, e.g.
from very low to very high, with no well-specified cri-
teria on how to determine the position on this scale.
Thus, these ratings result to be extremely subjective,
they may be interpreted differently by different analysts
and the resulting risk ratings may not be well grounded
or accurate. To reduce subjectivity, some methodologies
for risk assessment define the scales for likelihood and
impact evaluation based on a set of well-defined crite-
ria. However, these criteria cannot be applied to eval-
uate the impact of a privacy risk because the impact
of a security risk is rated only from the perspective of
an organization rather than from the perspective of the
data subject. The criteria are also considered equally
important in assessing the impact but this does not
hold for privacy attacks where the effectiveness of the
criteria to estimate the impact strongly depends on the
circumstances of the specific attack. For example, the
scale of a data breach e.g number of records disclosed is
an effective criteria in rating the impact of the breach
but not for an attack where an individual has been iden-
tified into a data set, where only one record is affected.
A systematic approach to assess the severity of a pri-
vacy risk is also needed in privacy threat analysis [7],
which is a similar process to DPIA, but with the goal
of identifying privacy threats and translating them into
viable strategies and solutions that can be mapped into
privacy-enhancing technologies. Threat analysis identi-
fies several risks that needs to be prioritized. For exam-
ple, the LINDDUN methodology [20] requires to rate
risk scores, but does not state specifically how these
scores should be determined; as for DPIA the analyst is
referred to established risk assessment techniques. Con-
sequently, a team of privacy analysts typically faces two
important challenges when prioritising privacy threats.
First, the need for a consistent and clear definition
of appropriate criteria to systematically measure the
severity of privacy risks; secondly a way to take into
account all team members’ opinions while modeling the
imprecision, subjectivity and vagueness inherent in lin-
guistic assessment. The fuzzy multi-criteria decision-
making problem (FMCDM) [10] has proven essential
in dealing with such limitations in several settings in-
cluding information security risk assessment [16]. Ac-
cordingly, we investigate the possibility of adapting the
FMCDM problem to address the problem of prioritiz-
ing privacy threats when linguistic variables are used
to get experts’ opinion for weights of criteria and rate
of alternatives.
Details about our contributions follow.
Contribution. In this paper we propose a methodol-
ogy to measure the severity of privacy risks.
– We first associate the impact and likelihood of pri-
vacy risks to well-defined criteria. Since criteria are
more specific than the high-level concepts of impact
and likelihood, they represent more fine-grained units
of measurement that make risk metrics more under-
standable and convenient. Risks measured using the
same unit can be meaningfully aggregated, in partic-
ular when putting together several decision makers
opinions, and directly compared, for example when
considering different threats to prioritize. We assess
the relevance of the criteria proposed with respect
to one of the largest recent security breaches: the
Cyber Equifax attack.
– Then, we adapt the fuzzy multi-criteria decision-
making problem to measure likelihood and impact
of threats.
A multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) problem
consists of determining the best option among sev-
eral alternatives when multiple criteria can be uti-
lized to rate the alternatives. In our setting, criteria
corresponds to those identified to characterize the
likelihood and the impact of privacy threats; the al-
ternatives correspond to the threats to be prioritized
according to their likelihood and impact. Since rat-
ings for alternatives consist of analysts’ opinions, we
consider fuzzy MCDM as fuzzy set theory is an ef-
ficient way for modeling the imprecision and vague-
ness inherent in linguistic assessment.
– Finally, we illustrate our methodology for a realistic
scenario that, inspired by the Equifax attack, pro-
vides a proof of concept for the appropriateness of
our approach. Specifically, we consider an online car
insurance company and focus on privacy threats tar-
geting the database storing customers’ information.
We stress that our methodology can be adopted
within any framework that requires to prioritize pri-
vacy risks based on their severity. However, to put
it in context, our case study illustrates our results
with respect to three threat categories of the LIND-
DUN taxonomy [20]: linkability, information disclo-
sure, and non compliance.
Organisation. The remainder of the paper is struc-
tured as follows. In Section 2 we review methodologies
for security and privacy risk assessment. In Section 3 we
provide an overview of LINDDUN methodology and we
introduce the basic concepts of fuzzy set theory. Then,
in Section 4 we introduce a set of criteria to evaluate
likelihood and impact of privacy risks, and our method-
ology to assess privacy risks. We illustrate the steps of
the methodology in Section 5 using a realistic scenario.
We conclude the paper in Section 6 by outlining future
research directions.
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2 Related Works
In this section we review the existing approaches to
assess security and privacy risks and discuss their limi-
tations.
2.1 Security Risk Assessment
Several security risk assessment methods and standards
have been proposed in the last years. Regardless the
specific process, they all require to rate the likelihood
and impact of a cyber attack to prioritize security risks
and guide the selection of appropriate mitigation.
However, these methods and standards significantly
differ in the way estimate the value of likelihood and
impact and how they combine these values to obtain
the risk level. For example, some methodologies like
CORAS [11] and the NIST 800-30 [17] standard require
analysts to define a qualitative scale for likelihood and
impact, assign a value to likelihood and impact and
then use a risk evaluation matrix to combine the values
of likelihood and impact into a risk level. These method
to estimate risk is subjective because it strongly de-
pends on the opinion and expertise of the analyst. It
also do not allow a comparison of the results done by
two different analysts.
Other methodologies instead define criteria to es-
timate likelihood and impact, assign a value to these
criteria and then use multiplication and/or addition of
the values to compute the overall risk level. Examples
of these methodologies are Octave Allegro [4] and the
OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [15]. Octave Allegro
requires the analyst to evaluate a risk level based on the
impact that an attack have on the victim organization.
The impact is assessed in terms of areas of impact: rep-
utation, financial, productivity, safety and health, and
fines and legal penalties. Each area is ranked based on
the impact that it has on the organization’s business
goals and the values assigned to the impact areas and
their rank are multiplied to obtain the overall risk score.
To address imprecision, subjectivity and vagueness
inherent in linguistic assessment of likelihood and im-
pact, some works have adopted decision theory and
fuzzy logic. For instance, de Gusmao et al. developed
an approach to security risk analysis that combines de-
cision theory and fuzzy logic [6]. Shameli-Sendi et al.
consider the fuzzy MCDM problem to effectively per-
form information security risk analysis [16]. In particu-
lar, they proposed a fuzzy expert system to assess the
risks of information systems by linking expert opinions
with respect to specific criteria with linguistic variables.
2.2 Privacy Risk Assessment
The few existing methodologies for assessing privacy
risks have some limitations. Some methodologies like
the one proposed by the Data Protection Authorities
in France, Germany, Spain and UK [5,9,1,13] do not
provide specific criteria to evaluate the severity and the
likelihood nor a formula to combine them.
Other methodologies provide criteria but they are
specific to category of privacy threats. For instance,
ENISA [8] has proposed a methodology to assess the
severity of personal data breaches. The main criteria
are data processing context (DPC), ease of identifica-
tion(EI), and circumstances of breach(CB). The data
processing context captures the type of breached data
together with a number of factors linked to the con-
text of processing. The ease of identification determine
how easy it is to identify an individual in the breached
data. The circumstances of breach includes the loss of
security of breach data and the malicious intent of the
attacker. The overall severity is then computed as the
product of DPC and EI plus the value of CB.
The remaining methodologies provide criteria for
likelihood and impact estimation, but they combine
these values using approaches that do not reduce the
subjectivity of the evaluation.
The OWASP Top 10 List of Privacy Risks for web
applications [14] evaluates privacy risks as a product of
the likelihood and impact. The likelihood is estimated
based on the results of a survey where experts rated the
frequency of the top 10 privacy vulnerability in web ap-
plications. The impact is evaluated from the perspective
of the organisation and of the individual. The former is
assessed in terms of reputation and financial loss, while
the one on the individual is rated based on the social
standing and reputation, financial well being and per-
sonal freedom. The overall impact is computed as the
average of the values assigned to each criteria.
Similarly, Wagner and Boiten [18] propose a set of
criteria to assess the likelihood and impact of privacy
risks. Impact is rated based on the scale of the attack,
the sensitivity of the breached data, the expectation of
the individual, and the harm to the individuals affected
by the attack. Instead, the likelihood is given by the
likelihood of attack and the likelihood of adverse effect.
Rather than providing a method to combine the values
assigned to each of the criteria to evaluate impact and
likelihood, they measure the different criteria separately
and then combine them visually using a radar plot.
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Threat Category Privacy Property Threat Instance
Linkability Unilinkability Guess someone uson a diet by linking his online search for recipes
Identifiability Anonimity, Pseudoanonimity Identify a user in a database
Non Repudiation Plausible Deniability Determine who express a vote in an online voting system
Detectability Undetectability, Unobservability Determine who is accessing a web page
Disclosure of Information Confidentiality Data breach
Unawareness Awareness Sharing pictures on Facebook with unintended audience
Non-Compliance Compliance Disclosing data to third party without user’s consent
Table 1 LINDDUN Privacy Threats Taxonomy and Examples.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 LINDDUN Overview
LINDDUN [20] is a privacy threat modeling technique.
LINDDUN acronym stands for the categories of pri-
vacy threats that the methodology helps to identify:
Linkability, Identifiability, Non-repudiation, Detectabil-
ity, Disclosure of Information, Unawareness, and Non-
compliance. The threat categories in the taxonomy negate
corresponding privacy properties: Unlinkability, Anon-
imity and Pseudoanonimity, Plausible Deniability, Un-
detectability, Confidentiality, Awareness and Compli-
ance. Table 1 shows the LINDDUN privacy threat cat-
egories and corresponding privacy properties along ap-
propriate examples.
LINDDUN analysis consists of six steps. The first
three represent the problem space while the remaining
three correspond to the solution space:
– Problem Space
1. A Data Flow Diagram (DFD) of the system un-
der analysis is created, which represents how in-
formation flow into the system, how they are
processed and where they are stored;
2. Each element in the DFD is mapped with a num-
ber of LINDDUN privacy threat categories;
3. The privacy threat categories are refined in con-
crete threat scenarios.
– Solution Space
1. Privacy threats are prioritized based on their
risks;
2. An appropriate mitigation strategy is selected to
address the highest privacy risks;
3. Specific privacy enhancing technologies (PETs)
have to be selected to implement the selected
strategy.
3.2 Fuzzy Set Theory
Opinions cannot always be expressed in a precise way,
often they are vague and uncertain. In order to model
these situations more precisely, the fuzzy set theory,
was proposed in [21] by L.A. Zadeh.
Given a set X called the discourse and a subset
A ⊆ X. A fuzzy set is a pair (A,µA) where µA is a
membership function µA : A→ [0, 1]. The value µA(x)
characterizes the grade of membership of x in A.
3.3 Triangular Fuzzy Number
A fuzzy number is a convex fuzzy set of the real line
R such that there exists a single x0 ∈ R, called the
mean value, where µA(x0) = 1, while µA(x) is piece-
wise continuous.
One of the most used fuzzy number types is the
triangular fuzzy number. Its membership function has
the shape of a triangle, as shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1 Membership function of a triangular fuzzy number.
The membership function of the triangular fuzzy
number F˜ is formalized as
F˜ =

0 x < a and x > c
x−a
b−a a ≤ x ≤ b
c−x
c−b b ≤ x ≤ c
1 x = b
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where a, b, c of Figure 1 can be interpreted as the
lower bound, the peak point and the upper bound of
the fuzzy number, respectively. The triangular fuzzy
number can be formally written as follows:
F˜ = (a, b, c).
Given two triangular fuzzy numbers A˜ = (a, b, c)
and ˜B = (d, e, f), four main operations can be expressed
as follows:
[Addition] A˜⊕ B˜ = (a+ d, b+ e, c+ f);
[Multiplication] A˜⊗ B˜ = (ad, be, cf);
[Multiplication by a real number k] k⊗A˜ = (ka, kb, kc);
[Division] A˜
B˜
= (ad ,
b
e ,
c
f ).
The signed distance of a triangular fuzzy number A˜
is defined as follows:
d(A˜) =
1
4
(a+ 2b+ c).
3.4 Fuzzy Multi-Criteria Decision Making Problem
A multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) problem con-
sists of determining the best option among several al-
ternatives when multiple criteria can be utilized to rate
the alternatives. Let A1, A2, . . . , Am be possible alter-
natives and C1, C2, . . . , Cn be criteria against which al-
ternative performance are measured. A MCDM prob-
lem can be expressed in matrix format (decision matrix)
as
D =

x11 x12 . . . x1n
x21 x22 . . . x2n
...
...
. . .
...
xm1 xm2 . . . xmn

w =
[
w1 w2 . . . wn
]
where xij is the rating of alternative Ai with re-
spect to criterion Cj and wj is the weight of criterion
Cj . Fuzzy multi-criteria models are used to assess alter-
natives in situations where crisp data are inadequate.
In such cases the ratings of alternatives and weights
of the criteria in the problem can be evaluated using
linguistic values represented by fuzzy numbers. A lin-
guistic variable is a variable whose values are words or
sentences in a natural or artificial language. These lin-
guistic variables can be expressed in positive triangular
fuzzy numbers. Specifically, Table 2 and Table 3 present
linguistic variables and fuzzy numbers for, respectively,
the weight of individual criteria and the ratings of al-
ternatives.
Linguistic Variables Fuzzy Numbers
Very Low (VL) (0,0,0.1)
Low (L) (0,0.1,0.3)
Medium Low (ML) (0.1,0.3,0.5)
Medium (M) (0.3,0.5,0.7)
Medium High (MH) (0.5,0.7,0.9)
High (H) 0.7,0.9,1.0)
Very High (VH) (0.9,1.0,1.0)
Table 2 Linguistic Variables and Fuzzy numbers for the
weights of criteria.
In MCDM, normalization techniques usually map
attributes (criteria) with different measurement units
to a common scale in the interval [0, 1] [3]. Each nor-
malization method is divided in two formulas, one for
benefit and another for cost criteria, to ensure that the
final rating is logically correct, i.e. when it is a bene-
fit criterion for high values it will correspond to high
normalized values (maximization - benefit) and when
it is a cost criterion high values will correspond to low
normalized values (minimization - cost).
Let D˜ a decision matrix for a fuzzy MCDM, the
linear scale transformation transforms matrix D˜ to a
normalized fuzzy decision matrix
R˜ = [r˜ij ]m×n
such that
r˜ij = (
aij
cj∗ ,
bij
cj∗ ,
cij
cj∗ )
if Cj is a benefit criterion where cj∗ = maxi cij , other-
wise
Linguistic Variables Fuzzy Numbers
Very Poor (VP) (0,0,1)
Poor (P) (0,1,3)
Medium Poor (MP) (1,3,5)
Fair (F) (3,5,7)
Medium Good (MG) (5,7,9)
Good (G) (7,9,10)
Very Good (VG) (9,10,10)
Table 3 Linguistic Variables and Fuzzy numbers for the rat-
ings of alternatives.
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r˜ij = (
a¯j
cij
,
a¯ij
bij
,
a¯j
aij
)
if Cj is a cost criterion where a¯j = mini aij .
4 Proposed Methodology
In this section we first present the criteria for evaluat-
ing the likelihood and impact of privacy violations. The
relevance of such criteria is assessed with respect to the
Cyber Equifax attack, one of the largest recent security
breaches carried out against one of the major credit re-
porting agencies [12]. Then, we utilize a fuzzy-based ap-
proach for assessing the level of risk of a privacy threat.
4.1 Evaluation Criteria
Likelihood. The likelihood of a privacy threat esti-
mates the probability that an attacker will discover a
vulnerability and will successfully exploit it. We eval-
uate the likelihood based on characteristics of the at-
tacker and of the vulnerability being exploited and whether
there are security controls in place [17]. The motivation,
capabilities and target give an indication of whether
the attacker will initiate the privacy threat or not. If
conducting the privacy threat requires more capability
than the attacker has, then the attacker most likely will
not initiate the threat. Similarly, if an attacker does not
expect to achieve its intended objectives by executing
the attack, the attacker will not initiate the privacy
threat. If an attacker is not targeting a specific asset in
the system, the probability that he will start the attack
is very low. If an attacker does not find a vulnerabil-
ity or the vulnerability is not easy to exploit it will not
start the attack. The Equifax company, for instance, is a
natural target for hackers, given the kind of information
that credit reporting agencies need to handle. Moreover,
the vulnerability at the ground of the attack was easy
to exploit and well-known to the attackers. In partic-
ular, the vulnerability was present in an open-source
framework called Apache Struts that Equifax uses for
its online disputes application. The Apache Software
Foundation released information regarding the vulner-
ability, along with an update to fix the issue about two
months before the attack took place. Equifax did not
update its system leaving to hackers the opportunity of
exploiting the vulnerability with little capabilities.
The presence of security controls such as encryption
of personal data or the presence of intrusion detection
systems or a logging mechanism could also prevent an
attacker to conduct an attack. Apparently, Equifax se-
curity had monitoring techniques in place. Indeed, they
noticed suspicious traffic related to its online disputes
portal so that the company eventually took down the
disputes application, but it was too late.Given the crite-
ria specified, the likelihood of the Equifax attack should
be moderate to moderate high. Therefore, our method-
ology would have correctly foreseen the attack as pos-
sible.
Impact. When considering the impact of a privacy
threat, there are two kinds of impact: the impact of
the organization holding the personal data and the im-
pact of the individuals whose privacy has been violated.
The impact for the organization acting as data con-
troller can be quantified in terms of financial damage,
reputation damage, non-compliance and the scale of the
attack [14,8]. The financial damage quantifies the costs
incurred by the organization to fix the vulnerability be-
ing exploited, or for recovering from the attack. The
reputation damage evaluates the loss of trust from cus-
tomers. Non compliance instead quantifies violation of
data protection regulations like GDPR and the cost of
fines paid for not being compliant. The scale of the
attack instead corresponds to number of individuals af-
fected by the privacy threat. The first major impact for
the Equifax attack which affected about 146 million in-
dividuals, was the loss of investor confidence. The share
price fell by 34% within the first week of notification of
the breach. The company also suffered a significant loss
of revenue due to reduced activity. Furthermore, the
way Equifax handled the reporting of the breach is a
clear example of non-compliance with the GDPR. In or-
der for Equifax to be GDPR compliant, it should have
reported the breach to the ICO within 72 hours (as for
Article 33 of the GDPR) as well as informed the data
subjects without undue delay (as for Article 34 of the
GDPR). Equifax waited five weeks which is a substan-
tial delay. It is very likely that the Equifax data breach
could have avoided if correct procedures had been in
place.
The impact to the individual depends on the type of
breached data, ease of identification, loss of data confi-
dentiality, loss of data integrity and loss of data avail-
ability [8]. The type of data determines the severity
of the attack: e.g if only the name of an individual is
disclosed, the severity is lower than if the credit card
information were disclosed. Ease of identification evalu-
ates how easy is for the attacker to match the breached
data with one or more individuals. Loss of confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability estimates the technical
impact of the attack on the individual. The Equifax at-
tack did not result in a loss of availability but just in a
loss of confidentiality and integrity because cyber crim-
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inals gained access to personal information like names,
addresses, dates of birth, credit score and social security
numbers and this information could have been included
in fraudulent credit rating and loan applications.
4.2 Fuzzy-based Privacy Risk Assessment
In this section we propose the use of fuzzy theory to es-
timate the likelihood and the impact of privacy threats
in order to deal with the imprecision and vagueness in-
herent in linguistic assessment. In particular, we adapt
the fuzzy multiple criteria decision-making approach,
utilized for solving facility location selection problems
in [2], to the problem of performing effective privacy
risk assessments.
The proposed approach consists of three stages: 1)
the rating stage; 2) the aggregation stage; and 3) the se-
lection stage. In the rating stage, given m threats and
n evaluation criteria, k decision-makers express their
opinions (or weights) about the importance of each cri-
terion in assessing the likelihood and the impact inten-
sity of privacy threats as well as their ratings about the
severity of each threat with respect to each specified
criterion. In this stage, decision makers opinions, nor-
mally stated in fuzzy data form such as linguistic terms,
are converted into triangular fuzzy numbers. In the ag-
gregation stage, weights and ratings are aggregated and
normalized in order to compute weighted fuzzy matri-
ces with respect to both likelihood and impact criteria.
In the selection state, the level of risk for threat is com-
puted by using fuzzy values for likelihood and impact.
Finally, after defazzification, threats can be prioritized
according to their level of risk.
Next, we describe the details of the three aforemen-
tioned stages.
Rating Stage. This stage consists of four phases:
[Phase 1] Decision-making opinions are collected
and linguistic weighting variables as well as lin-
guistic rating variables are identified in order for
decision-makers to assess criteria importance in
estimating the likelihood and the impact of pri-
vacy threats.
[Phase 2] Utilize linguistic weighting variables (Ta-
ble 2) to assess criteria importance.
[Phase 3] Utilize linguistic weighting variables (Ta-
ble 3) to assess ratings performance of alterna-
tives (i.e. threats) with respect to each criterion.
[Phase 4] Opinions collected in the previous two
phases expressed in linguistic terms are converted
in fuzzy numbers.
Aggregation Stage. This stage consists of seven phases:
[Phase 1] Compute aggregated fuzzy weights of indi-
vidual criterion.
Specifically, let w˜jt = (ajt, bjt, cjt), where j = 1, . . . , n
and t = 1, . . . , k be the weights associated to the cri-
terion Cj by decision maker Dt, then the aggregate
fuzzy weight for criterion Cj is computed as
w˜j = (aj , bj , cj) =
1
k
(w˜j1 ⊕ . . .⊕ w˜jk).
Let C1, . . . , Cn1 be criteria to assess likelihood and
let Cn1+1, . . . , Cn criteria to assess impact.
[Phase 2] Compute aggregated fuzzy ratings with re-
spect of likelihood criteria for each threat. Specifi-
cally, the matrix L˜ of fuzzy ratings can be expressed
as follows:
L˜ =

x˜11 x˜12 . . . x˜1n1
x˜21 x˜22 . . . x˜2n1
...
...
. . .
...
x˜m1 x˜m2 . . . x˜mn1

where
x˜ij =
1
k
(x˜ij
1 ⊕ . . .⊕ x˜ijk)
is the aggregated fuzzy rating of alternative Ti with
respect of criterion Cj where x˜ij
t is the rating by
Dt of alternative Ti with respect of criterion Cj , for
each t = 1, . . . , k.
[Phase 3] Compute aggregated fuzzy ratings with re-
spect to impact criteria for each threat. Specifically,
for each i = 1, . . . ,m, j = n1 + 1, . . . , n, the matrix
I˜ of fuzzy ratings can be expressed as follows:
I˜ =

x˜1n1+1 x˜1n1+2 . . . x˜1n
x˜2n1+1 x˜2n1+2 . . . x˜2n
...
...
. . .
...
x˜mn1+1 x˜mn1+2 . . . x˜mn

where
x˜ij =
1
k
(x˜ij
1 ⊕ . . .⊕ x˜ijk)
is the aggregated fuzzy rating of alternative Ti with
respect of criterion Cj where x˜ij
t is the rating by
Dt of alternative Ti with respect of criterion Cj , for
each t = 1, . . . , k.
8 Stephen Harth et al.
Threat Category Threat Instance
T1 Linkability Infer a customer has a disease by linking his geolocation data with Point-of-Interest
T2 Information Disclosure Exploit SQL Injection vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to database
T3 Non Compliance Share geolocation data with a location-specific advertising company without user’s consent
Table 4 Privacy Threats to Customer Database.
Likelihood Criteria DM1 DM2 Aggregated Fuzzy Weight Normalized Weight
C1: Attacker’s Motivation H MH (0.6,0.8,0.95) 0.21
C2: Attacker’s Capabilities H H (0.7,0.9,1.0) 0.23
C3: Attacker’s Target MH M (0.4,0.6,0.8) 0.16
C4: Vulnerability’s Exploitability MH H (0.6,0.8,0.95) 0.21
C5: Existing Security Controls MH MH (0.5,0.7,0.9) 0.19
Data Controller’s Impact Citeria DM1 DM2 Fuzzy Weight Normalized Weight
C6: Scale H H (0.7,0.9,1.0) 0.15
C7: Financial Damage H VH (0.8,0.95,1.0) 0.15
C8: Reputation Damage MH H (0.6,0.8,0.95) 0.13
C9: Non-Compliance H H (0.7,0.9,1.0) 0.15
Data Subject’s Impact Criteria DM1 DM2 Fuzzy Weight Normalized Weight
C10: Type of Breached Data M H (0.5,0.7,0.85) 0.11
C11: Ease of Identification MH H (0.6,0.8,0.95) 0.13
C12: Loss of Confidentiality H H (0.7,0.9,1.0) 0.15
C13: Loss of Integrity ML M (0.2,0.4,0.6) 0.07
C14: Loss of Availability M M (0.3,0.5,0.7) 0.08
Table 5 Importance Weight of Criteria.
[Phase 4] Defuzzify the fuzzy weights of the privacy
criteria by using the signed distance. Specifically,
for each j = 1, . . . , n, the defuzzification of w˜j =
(aj , bj , cj) is computed as:
d(w˜j) =
1
4
(aj + 2bj + cj).
Moreover, for each j = 1, . . . , n, the j − th element
wj of the normalized weights vector w = [w1, w2, . . . , wn]
is computed as follows:
wj =
d(w˜j)∑n
j=1 d(w˜j)
.
We denote wL = [w1, . . . , wn1 ] be the normalized
vector of aggregated fuzzy weights with respect of
the likelihood and wI = [wn1+1, . . . , wn] be the nor-
malized vector of aggregated fuzzy weights with re-
spect of impact.
[Phase 5] Apply linear normalization to both matrices
L˜ and I˜ as shown in Section 3.3 to obtain normalized
matrices L˜N and I˜N .
[Phase 6] Compute the weights with respect of likeli-
hood criteria by multiplying the matrix L˜N by the
vector wTL which is the transposed vector of wL.
[Phase 7] Compute the weights with respect of impact
criteria by multiplying the matrix I˜N by the vector
wTI which is the transposed vector of wI .
Notice that the rating stage and the aggregate stage
could be executed by different sets of experts. Moreover,
being the criteria fixed, the weights associated to them
during the rating stage could be used to perform more
than one analysis.
Selection Stage. This stage consists of four phases:
[Phase 1] Compute the values of likelihood for each
threat by adding all values related to each likelihood
criterion.
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Criteria Threat DM1 DM2
C1
T1 G G
T2 VG VG
T3 P MP
C2
T1 VG VG
T2 VG VG
T3 F MP
C3
T1 F MG
T2 VG VG
T3 F P
C4
T1 P MP
T2 VG VG
T3 P P
C5
T1 VP P
T2 G VG
T3 VP VP
C6
T1 F MG
T2 VG VG
T3 F MP
C7
T1 G G
T2 MG G
T3 VG VG
C8
T1 P P
T2 VG VG
T3 G G
C9
T1 G G
T2 G MG
T3 VG VG
C10
T1 G G
T2 VG VG
T3 G G
C11
T1 G MG
T2 VG VG
T3 F MP
C12
T1 G MG
T2 VG VG
T3 P MP
C13
T1 P P
T2 F MP
T3 VP VP
C14
T1 VP VP
T2 F F
T3 P VP
Table 6 Ratings of Customer’s Database Threats Under All
Criteria.
[Phase 2] Compute the values of impact for each threat
by adding all values related to each impact criterion.
[Phase 3] Multiply the fuzzy values of likelihood and
impact of each threat and obtain the deffuzified val-
ues by applying the signed distance method.
[Phase 4] Compare the results obtained to prioritize
the threats according to their risks.
5 Case Study
In this section we illustrate the steps of our methodol-
ogy for privacy risk assessment. We consider a realis-
tic scenario where DriveSafe is an online car insurance
company that offers pay as you go car insurance poli-
cies at competitive prices. In order to benefit from the
pay as you go policy, customers have to install a smart
device in their car that collects information about their
driving. The smart device collects information like ge-
olocation (GPS signal) and speed. This information is
sent via satellite to the car insurance company’s cen-
tral servers where it is stored in a database along with
other customer information such as its name and ad-
dress and the credit card details used to pay the in-
surance premium. The customer information are not
pseudonymised nor encrypted before being stored in
the database. For the analysis we will focus on privacy
threats targeting the database storing customer infor-
mation. We have identified three main categories and
instances of threats that are applicable to the database
following the first three steps of the LINDDUN method-
ology introduced in Section 2. The threats are listed in
Table 4. The company’s owner hired two privacy an-
alysts to assess possible privacy risks. Very recently a
novel SQL injection vulnerability was reported. Thus,
the two analysts, envisioning a concrete possibility of
data breach, associate high weights to the likelihood
criteria of capabilities and ease of exploiting with re-
spect to threat T2. Similarly, the scale, the reputation
damage as well as ease of identification and loss of con-
fidentiality impact criteria weights for T2 are consid-
ered to be significant by both analysts. Indeed, since
DriveSafe’s assets include valuable information for at-
tackers, it is likely that the vulnerability will be ex-
ploited if not patched, causing significant financial and
reputation losses, as happened with the Equifax attack.
The resulting data breach could also facilitate attackers
on exploring other threats categories such as linkability.
For instance, attackers can infer private and valuable
information by linking costumer’s geolocation data and
their point of interest once such data has been licked.
See threat T1 in Table 4 for a concrete example. For
the reasons above, it is reasonable to expect that T2 is
the threat with the highest level of risk.
In the following we denote with D1 and D2 the two
analysts (decision makers). Their opinions will be col-
lected in order to prioritize the identified threats. Then,
the three stages described in section 4.2 will be followed
at the extent of first characterizing the likelihood and
the impact of each threat and, subsequently, comput-
ing the corresponding level of risk. In the following we
illustrate the three stages in details:
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C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
T1 (7,9,10) (9,10,10) (4,6,8) (0.5,2,4) (0,0.5,2)
T2 (9,10,10) (9,10,10) (9,10,10) (9,10,10) (8, 9.5,10)
T3 (0.5,2,4) (2,4,6) (1.5,3,5) (0,1,3) (0,0,1)
Table 7 Aggregated ratings with respect of likelihood criteria.
C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14
T1 (4,6,8) (7,9,10) (0,1,3) (7,9,10) (7,9,10) (6,8,9.5) (6,8,9.5) (0,1,3) (0,0,1)
T2 (9,10,10) (6,8,9.5) (9,10,10) (6,8,9.5) (9,10,10) (9,10,10) (9,10,10) (2,4,6) (3,5,7)
T3 (2,4,6) (9,10,10) (7,9,10) (9,10,10) (7,9,10) (2,4,6) (0.5,2,4) (0,0,1) (0,0.5,2)
Table 8 Aggregated ratings with respect of impact criteria.
Rating Stage. This stage consists of four phases:
[Phase 1] Decision-making opinions are collected
to assess criteria importance in estimating the
likelihood and the impact of privacy threats.
[Phase 2] Importance of criteria are assessed by
using linguistic weighting variables in Table 2 as
shown in Table 5.
[Phase 3] Performance of alternatives (i.e. threats)
with respect of each criterion is assessed utilizing
linguistic weighting variables in Table 3 as shown
in Table 6.
[Phase 4] Opinions expressed in linguistic terms are
converted in fuzzy numbers according to Table
2 and Table 3.
Aggregation Stage. This stage consists of seven phases:
[Phase 1] Compute aggregated fuzzy weights of in-
dividual criterion.
Specifically, let w˜jt = (ajt, bjt, cjt), where j =
1, . . . , n and t = 1, 2 be the weights associated
to the criterion Cj by decision maker Dt, then
the aggregate fuzzy weight for criteria Cj is com-
puted as
w˜j = (aj , bj , cj) =
1
2
(w˜j1 ⊕ w˜j2)
as shown in Table 5.
[Phase 2] Compute the matrix of aggregated fuzzy rat-
ings with respect of likelihood criteria as shown in
Table 7.
[Phase 3] Compute the matrix of aggregated fuzzy rat-
ings with respect of impact criteria as shown in Ta-
ble 8.
[Phase 4] First defuzzify the fuzzy weights of the pri-
vacy criteria by using the signed distance and then
compute the normalized values as shown in Table 5.
T1 T2 T3
C1 (0.7,0.9,1) (0.9,1,1) (0.05,0.2,0.4)
C2 (0.9,1,1) (0.9,1,1) (0.2,0.4,0.6)
C3 (0.4,0.6,0.8) (0.9,1,1) (0.15,0.3,0.5)
C4 (0.05,0.2,0.4) (0.9,1,1) (0,0.1,0.3)
C5 (0,0.05,0.2) (0.8,0.95,1) (0,0,0.1)
Table 9 Normalized fuzzy matrix with respect of Likelihood
criteria.
T1 T2 T3
C6 (0.4,0.6,0.8) (0.9,1,1) (0.2,0.4,0.6)
C7 (0.7,0.9,1) (0.6,0.8,0.95) (0.9,1,1)
C8 (0,0.1,0.3) (0.9,1,1) (0.7,0.9,1)
C9 (0.7,0.9,1) (0.6,0.8,0.95) (0.9,1,1)
C10 (0.7,0.9,1) (0.9,1,1) (0.7,0.9,1)
C11 (0.6,0.8,0.95) (0.9,1,1) (0.2,0.4,0.6)
C12 (0.6,0.8,0.95) (0.9,1,1) (0.05,0.2,0.4)
C13 (0,0.16,0.5) (0.3,0.6,1) (0,0,0.16)
C14 (0,0,0.14) (0.4,0.7,1) (0,0.07,0.2)
Table 10 Normalized fuzzy matrix with respect of Impact
criteria.
T1 T2 T3
C1 (0.15,0.19,0.21) (0.19,0.21,0.21) (0.01,0.04,0.08)
C2 (0.20,0.23,0.23) (0.20,0.23,0.23) (0.04,0.09,0.13)
C3 (0.06,0.09,0.12) (0.14,0.16,0.16) (0.02,0.04,0.08)
C4 (0.01,0.04,0.08) (0.18,0.21,0.21) (0,0.02,0.06)
C5 (0,0,0.03) (0.15,0.18,0.19) (0,0,0.01)
Table 11 Weighted normalized matrix with respect of Like-
lihood criteria.
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T1 T2 T3
C6 (0.06,0.09,0.12) (0.13,0.15,0.15) (0.03,0.06 0.09)
C7 (0.10,0.13,0.15) (0.09,0.12,0.14) (0.13,0.15, 0.15)
C8 (0,0.01,0.03) (0.11,0.13,0.13) (0.09,0.11,0.13)
C9 (0.10,0.13,0.15) (0.09,0.120.14) (0.13,0.15,0.15)
C10 (0.07,0.09,0.11) (0.09,0.11,0.11) (0.07,0.09, 0.11)
C11 (0.07,0.10,0.12) (0.11,0.13,0.13) (0.02,0.05, 0.07)
C12 (0.09,0.12,0.14) (0.13,0.15,0.15) (0.007,0.03, 0.06)
C13 (0,0.01,0.03) (0.02,0.04,0.07) (0,0,0.01)
C14 (0,0,0.011) (0.03,0.06,0.08) (0,0.006,0.022)
Table 12 Weighted normalized matrix with respect of Im-
pact criteria.
Fuzzy Likelihood Fuzzy Impact Risk Level
T1 (0.42,0.56,0.69) (0.5,0.7,0.8) (0.2,0.4,0.6)
T2 (0.88,0.99,1) (0.8,1,1) (0.7,0.99,1)
T3 (0.08,0.2,0.38) (0.47,0.64,0.97) (0.03,0.12,0.36)
Table 13 Fuzzy likelihood values, fuzzy impact values, and
fuzzy level of risk per threat.
[Phase 5] Linear normalization is applied to both the
matrix of fuzzy ratings with respect of likelihood
criteria and the matrix of fuzzy ratings with respect
of impact criteria. The resulting matrices are shown
in Table 9 and 10. Notice that all criteria in our
example are benefit criteria.
[Phase 6] The normalized weighted matrix with re-
spect of likelihood criteria is represented in Table
11.
[Phase 7] The normalized weighted matrix with re-
spect of impact criteria is represented in Table 12.
Selection Stage. This stage consists of four phases:
[Phase 1] Compute the values of likelihood of each
threat by adding all values related to each likeli-
hood criterion. These values are shown in Table
13.
[Phase 2] Compute the values of impact of each
threat by adding all values related to each im-
pact criterion. These values are shown in Table
13.
[Phase 3] Multiply the fuzzy values of likelihood
and impact of each threat to obtain their level
of risk (see Table 13 ). Then compute deffuzified
values by applying the signed distance method
(see Table 13).
[Phase 4] Consider the results obtained to prioritize
the threats. Our methodology shows that T2 and
Risk Level Defuzz. Value
T2 (0.7,0.99,1) 0.92
T1 (0.2,0.4,0.6) 0.4
T3 (0.03,0.12,0.36) 0.15
Table 14 Fuzzy value and defazzification value of the level
of risk per threat.
T3 are respectively the threats with the highest
and lowest level of risk (see Table 14) confirming
our original hypothesis.
6 Conclusions
A Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) is a pro-
cess that helps organization to identify, assess and min-
imize the data protection risks of their data processing
activities. However, the existing DPIA methodologies
do not provide an effective solution to assess and pri-
oritize privacy risks because they rely upon an analyst
to rate the impact and likelihood of the risks.
In this paper we have proposed a set of well-defined
criteria that analysts can use to measure the likelihood
and the impact of a privacy risk. Then, we adopt the
fuzzy multi-criteria decision-making approach to sys-
tematically measure the severity of privacy risks while
modeling the imprecision and vagueness inherent in lin-
guistic assessment. Our realistic case study, inspired
by the real scenario in which the Equifax attack took
place, provides a proof of concept that our method-
ology is appropriate for prioritizing privacy risks. We
leave as future work the investigation about different
ways of evaluating the proposed methodology such as
comparing the effectiveness of our approach with other
multi-criteria decision making techniques such as ana-
lytic hierarchy process (AHP). We also plan to explore
the use of multi-criteria decision making approaches to
select alternative organizational and technical measures
to address the highest privacy risks.
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